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BURLINGTON NORTHERN

& SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. V.

WHITE: GETTING ON THE RIGHT TRACK
Lindsay Conway Thomas*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted Title VII to prevent and remedy employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion and national origin.1 Additionally, Title VII forbids retaliatory discrimination against employees who
have engaged in an activity protected by the Act.2 Recently, the Supreme
Court of the United States moved onto the right track to protect employees
from retaliation. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,
the Court defined the scope and severity of retaliation cognizable under
Title VII, resolving a split among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal.3 Previously, some courts had required higher threshold conduct for
actionable retaliation than others.4 In White, the Court adopted an expansive approach in accord with the courts that had deemed less severe retaliation cognizable.5 The standard enunciated in White reflects the Court's
appreciation for the many forms that retaliation may assume and the chilling effect retaliation has on the overall purpose of Title VII. This Note will
analyze the majority holding and concurring opinion in White, as well as
the interplay between the current standards for retaliation, hostile work
environment harassment, and constructive discharge.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1997, Shelia White was the only female employed in the Maintenance of Way department at Burlington's Tennessee Yard.6 In June of that
year, White was hired as a "track laborer," a position that entails manually
removing and replacing track components and clearing debris such as
* The author gratefully acknowledges the mentorship of Professor Judy Johnson throughout
the drafting of this Note. Her guidance and thoughtful consideration of the issues developed herein
was vital to the creation of this product. I also want to thank my parents for their gracious support and
wise advice throughout my life.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
3. 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
4. Compare Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding cognizable retaliation includes only "ultimate employment decisions includ[ing] acts such as hiring, firing,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating") with Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding an "adverse employment action" meaning "any adverse treatment that is based
on a retaliatory motive and reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in a
protected activity" is actionable retaliation).
5. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
6. Id .at 2409.
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spilled cargo and brush.7 Given her previous experience operating forklifts, White was promptly assigned to a forklift operator position, a more
prestigious and sought-after job.8
In September 1997, White complained to Burlington officials that her
supervisor had repeatedly made sex-based, inappropriate comments to her
in the presence of her male co-workers. 9 Following an investigation, Burlington temporarily suspended White's supervisor and required that he attend sexual-harassment training.'" Simultaneously, Burlington removed
White from forklift operation and reassigned her to a track labor position
on the grounds that "a more senior man should have the less arduous and
cleaner job of forklift operator."" Although White earned the same wages
for both positions, 12the track laborer position was admittedly more arduous
and less desirable.
Following the reassignment, White filed two complaints against Burlington with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In
October 1997, White's complaint alleged that reassignment to track laborer
constituted "unlawful gender-based discrimination and retaliation" because of her previous complaint of gender discrimination and sexual harassment.1 3 In December 1997, White filed another retaliation charge with
the EEOC that alleged Burlington's roadmaster had "placed her under surveillance and was monitoring her daily activities."' 4
Approximately three days after copies of the second EEOC complaint
were mailed to Burlington, 5 White was suspended indefinitely without pay
following a disagreement with a supervisor who claimed that she was insubordinate. 6 At this time, White invoked internal grievance procedures
through which Burlington determined that she had not been insubordinate
and should not have been suspended. 7 White was then reinstated as a
track laborer and provided backpay in compensation for her thirty-seven
day suspension. 8 Subsequently, White filed a third charge with the EEOC
which alleged that the suspension was retaliatory.' 9
After she exhausted all administrative remedies, White filed a lawsuit
in the United States District Court of Western Tennessee alleging, inter
alia, that the reassignment of her job duties and thirty-seven day suspension without pay constituted an unlawful retaliation in violation of section
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2409.
White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2005).
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2409.
Id.
White, 364 F.3d at 794.
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2409.
Id.

18. Id.

19. Id.
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704 of Title VII. 2° A jury found for White on both retaliation claims and
awarded her $43,500 in compensatory damages, which included $3,250 in
medical expenses. 21 Burlington filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law, which was denied by the district court.2 2 Burlington appealed.2 3 A Sixth Circuit panel reversed the judgment and found for the
company on the grounds that White had failed to support her retaliation
claim because neither her transfer nor her suspension met the court's requisite "adverse employment action" standard.2 4 Upon rehearing en banc,
however, the full Court of Appeals vacated the panel's decision and then
affirmed the jury's findings on both retaliation claims.25
The en banc court unanimously affirmed the district court's judgment;
however, the judges failed to agree on the applicable retaliation standard.2 6
Writing for the majority, Judge Gibbons adhered to the moderate Sixth
Circuit "adverse employment action" standard requiring conduct materially affecting terms or conditions of employment, but not necessarily an
ultimate employment action.2 7 Judge Gibbons relied heavily on Kocsis v.
Multi-Care Management,28 explaining that the Supreme Court had also relied on Kocsis in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, which defines a tangible
employment action as requiring "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with different
29
responsibilities or a decision that causes a significant change in benefits.
Under the Sixth Circuit standard, the terms "adverse employment action"
and "tangible employment action" were interchangeable.3 0 To resolve the
existing circuit split concerning the proper applicable standard, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.31

III.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW

A.

Title VII Overview

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the principal federal statute
proscribing employment discrimination. Congress enacted Title VII as a
catalyst to rouse Americans to put a stop to discrimination in the workplace. While Title VII provides redress "to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of employment discrimination, its primary objective... is not to provide redress but to avoid harm. '3 2 To that effect, Title
20. Id. at 2410.
21. Id.
22. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2410.
23. Id.
24. White, 364 F.3d at 795.
25. Id. at 809.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 795-98.
28. 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996).
29. White, 364 F.3d at 798 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742. 761 (1998)).
30. Id. at 796 n.i. (citing Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461 n.5 ("Courts use the
terms tangible employment detriment and materially adverse employment action interchangeably.")).
31. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2411.
32. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998).
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VII generally serves a prophylactic purpose.33 When employers implement
anti-discrimination / anti-retaliation policies, inform personnel of impermissible conduct, and establish effective complaint procedures, the primary
objective of Title VII is effectuated.34
Title VII contains two primary provisions, Section 703 or the anti-discrimination provision,35 and Section 704 or the anti-retaliation provision.36
While both provisions are chiefly prophylactic, individually, they strive toward different goals, and thus have required divergent applications by employers and courts.
1. The Anti-Discrimination Provision
The anti-discrimination provision prohibits discrimination against job
applicants and employees on the basis of that individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '37 In McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the
Supreme Court explained that the primary goal of Section 703 is "to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered ... stratified work environ-

ments to the disadvantage of minority citizens. ' 3 The express language of
the provision limits its coverage to employment-related discrimination affecting the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. '39 In pertinent
part, Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of.employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any which way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.4 °

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n , 527 U.S. 526 (1999); Faragher,524 U.S. at 806.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2000).
42 U.S.C. § 200e-3(a)(2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2000).
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)(2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2000).
Id.
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The Anti-Retaliation Provision

The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits retaliation against
employees and applicants for employment "who have either availed themselves of Title VII's protections or assisted others in so doing."' 41 In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Supreme Court declared that the "primary
purpose" of the anti-retaliation provision is '4"[m]aintaining
unfettered ac2
cess to statutory and remedial mechanisms.
Both current and former employees are afforded protection under the
anti-retaliation provision.43 Section 704(a) provides absolute protection to
employees who have participated in any way in an investigation of a Title
VII violation. Employees who oppose unlawful employment practices
through complaint or protest are also afforded protection under Section
704(a). 4 An employee is generally not required to prove that the employer's underlying action unlawful to be protected under the anti-retaliation provision, provided that the employee has a reasonable belief that the
employer was engaged in an unlawful employment practice.4 5 In pertinent
part, Section 704(a) mandates:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any
practices made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.4 6
B. Proving Unlawful Retaliation Under Title VII
1. The Requisite Elements of Retaliatory Discrimination
The plaintiff in an unlawful retaliation case must satisfy the preliminary burden of proving a prima facie case of retaliation.4" Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in White,proving a prima facie case of retaliation
required that the plaintiff show (1) she was engaged in a statutorily protected expression under Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) that there is a causal connection between the protected expression and the adverse action.4 8 A plaintiff may prove such causal connection through either direct evidence of retaliatory intent or through
41. 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997).
42. Id. at 346.
43. Id. at 345.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)(2000).
45. See, e.g., Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1981); see
also Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269-70 (2001) (per curium).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)(2000).
47. E.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).
48. Id.
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circumstantial evidence. 49 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
scheme operates when the plaintiff seeks to prove a causal connection
through circumstantial evidence."0

.Under the McDonell Douglas scheme, if a plaintiff proves
a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden then shifts to the employer to produce
admissible evidence of "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the ad-

verse action. ' 51 Should the employer satisfy this burden, the presumption
of retaliation is eliminated, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to

demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason was merely pretextual.52
A plaintiff may prove the employer's reason was pretextual by showing:

"(1) [it] has no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the adverse action; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the adverse action.

' 53

Under this

burden-shifting scheme, the plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion.54

2.

The Three Approaches for Defining an Adverse Employment Action
in a Retaliatory Context

Although the Circuit Courts of Appeals have consistently applied the
burden-shifting scheme in the analysis of retaliation claims, the circuits
have previously applied vastly different requirements for the satisfaction of
each element of a plaintiff's prima facie case.55 For the purposes of this
Note, attention will be focused on the circuit split concerning the definition
of the second element of a prima facie retaliation claim, an adverse employment action.

The Circuit Courts of Appeals have propounded three distinct approaches in defining an adverse employment action in the retaliation context.56 Previously, the Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, along with the EEOC,
employed an expansive approach.57 Under this approach, an adverse employment action broadly consists of "any action that is reasonably likely to
49. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); Laderach v. U-Haul of Northwestern
Ohio, 207 F.3d 825, 829 (6th Cir. 2000).
50. E.g., Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240.
51. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
52. Id. at 804.
53. Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Manzar v. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)).
54. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Cntr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
55. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240-42; Brian Riddell & Richard A. Bales, Adverse Employment Action in
Retaliation Cases, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 313, 316-20 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the FBI's failure to
investigate death threats against a former agent constituted adverse employment action); Ray, 217 F.3d
at 1243-44 (holding elimination of employee meetings, elimination of flex-time policies, "workplace
lockdown," reduction of workload, and creation of a hostile work environment constituted adverse
employment action); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1452, 1455-56 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding adverse employment actions may include requiring an employee to work through his lunch break,
assigning a one-day suspension, soliciting express negative remarks about an employee from co-workers, changing an employee's schedule without notice, voicing negative remarks about an employee, and
delaying approval for medical treatment without cause); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.
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deter the charging party or others from engaging in future protected activities."'58 Conversely, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits previously adopted a moderate approach, whereby an
adverse employment action must "materially affect the terms and conditions of employment."59 However, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits previously employed a restrictive approach, whereby only
"ultimate employment decisions" created a cognizable adverse employment action.6 °
a.

The Expansive Approach

The expansive approach, as previously adopted by the First, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and the EEOC, defines an "adverse

employment action" as any action "reasonably likely to deter the charging

party or others from engaging in protected activity. ' 61 While the aforementioned circuits employed a broad definition of "adverse employment
action," materiality of the retaliation was also keenly emphasized by all
except the Ninth Circuit and the EEOC.61 The Seventh Circuit explained,
"[a]lthough the anti-retaliation rule in § 2000e-3(a) is broader than the

anti-discrimination rule in § 2000e-2(a) in the sense that it extends beyond
1996) (holding adverse employment actions include "moving the person from a spacious, brightly lit
office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available support services. .. or cutting off
challenging assignments"); Berry v. Stephenson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
malicious prosecution constitutes an adverse employment action); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13,
15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding adverse employment actions include "demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employees"); Riddell & Bales, supra note 55, at 333.
58. See cases cited supra note 57.
59. See White v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding reassignment of job duties to a dirtier and less prestigious position and indefinite suspension
without pay constituted an adverse employment action); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding "[a]dverse employment action includes any retaliatory act or harassment if, but
only if, that act or harassment results in an adverse effect on the 'terms, conditions, or benefits' of
employment"); Richardson v. New York State Dept. of Corr. Services, 180 F.3d 426, 444 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding a prison employee's "transfer and reassignment which involved different job responsibilities
... involving contact with the prison population constituted an adverse employment decision"); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1301 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding unsubstantiated oral reprimands
and unnecessary derogatory comments following [a] complaint do not rise to the level of the adverse
employment action"). For a good discussion of the circuit split see Irene Garner, The Retaliatory Harassment Claim: Expanding Employer Liability in Title VII Lawsuits, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 269,
295 (2006).
60. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding "hostility from
fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety, without more, do not constitute[e) ultimate
employment decisions, and therefore are not the required adverse employment actions"); Manning v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692-93 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that co-worker harassment did not
constitute an adverse employment action since it did not cause a "tangible change in duties or working
conditions that constitute a material employment disadvantage"); Riddell & Bales, supra note 55, at
331-32.
61. See cases cited, supra note 57.
62. E.g., Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219 ("materiality is implicit in the term 'discriminate' as it is used
in Title VII"); see Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (applying the EEOC standard that interprets "adverse employment action' to mean 'any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity" but no mention of
materiality requirement).
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pay and other tangible employment actions, nothing in § 2000e-3(a) says or
even hints that the significance or materiality requirement has been dispensed with."6 3 Additionally, the context of the retaliatory situation is important in the materiality analysis because what may be immaterial in
certain situations may be material in others.'
Under the expansive standard, retaliation does not have to alter the
terms or conditions of employment, provided that the action is materially
adverse or reasonably likely to discourage an employee from participating
in a protected activity.6 5 Examples of materially adverse actions under this
approach have included providing unfavorable job references, lateral transfers, unfounded performance evaluations, toleration of harassment by
other employees,6 6 discontinuation of challenging assignments, moving an
employee from a nice office to a dingy closet,6 7 malicious prosecution of a
former employee, 6s refusal to investigate death threats against a former
FBI agent, 69 creation of a hostile work environment, cancellation of flextime policies or other scheduling changes,7 ° requiring an employee to work
through her lunch break, assigning a one-day suspension, and causing un71
due delay in the authorization of medical treatment.
Proponents of the expansive approach have relied on the text and purpose of Title VII to support their view.72 Proffering a textual argument, the
Ninth Circuit asserted, "[a]ccording to 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a), it is unlawful
'for an employer to discriminate' against an employee in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. This provision does not limit what type of
discrimination is covered, nor does it proscribe a minimum level of severity
for actionable discrimination. ' 73 Using the expansive approach, courts reasoned that confining adverse employment actions to the terms and conditions of employment frustrates the "primary purpose" of the antiretaliation provision, which the Supreme Court has declared is "maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms. , 74 Courts that subscribed to this view maintained that it focuses on the deterrent effects of
retaliatory conduct, rather than the ultimate employment action, thus "effectuates the letter and purpose of Title VII. ' ' 75
63. Washington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005).
64. See id. at 662 (finding flex-time schedule vital to an employee caring for a son with Down
syndrome); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245-46 (finding removal of "self-management policy" critical to an employee caring for an ill spouse).
65. E.g., Washington, 420 F.3d at 660.
66. Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-16.
67. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334.
68. Berry, 74 F.3d at 986.
69. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219.
70. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243-44.
71. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1455-56.
72. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334; Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1216-17.
73. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
74. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1218 (citing Robinson, 519 U.S. at 347).
75. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; see Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1218.
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The Moderate Approach

The moderate approach, previously adopted by the Second, Third,

Fourth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal, defines an "adverse employment action" as an act that materially affects "the terms, conditions, or
benefits" of the plaintiff's employment.76 Ultimate employment actions,
such as hiring, discharging, or refusing to promote, certainly fell within the

moderate approach; however, such actions were not required, provided
that the requisite "terms or conditions of employment" standard was satisfied.77 This approach also emphasized the materiality requirement, as the
Third Circuit explained, ". . . objectionable conduct attributable to an employer is not always sufficient to alter an employee's terms, conditions, or

privileges
VII.'178 of employment and is thus not always sufficient to violate Title
Recognizing the moderate approach, courts have held that an array of
adverse employment actions may impact the terms of conditions of employment, while falling short of an ultimate employment action.7 9 In defin-

ing an adverse employment action, moderate approach courts seemed to
rely on the "tangible employment action" standard set forth by the Su-

preme Court in Ellerth.8° For example, a diminution in job duties or status,
unsubstantiated poor performance evaluations, or refusal of salary or bene-

fits, along with other significant employment actions comprised adverse
employment actions.81
The moderate approach courts acknowledged that retaliatory harass-

ment, including supervisor-created hostile work environment harassment,
may constitute an adverse employment action, provided the harassment
satisfies the "severe or pervasive" standard.8 2 An employer may be held
liable for supervisor-created hostile work environment retaliation, but the
employer may also be afforded an affirmative defense.8 3 Moreover, the
Second Circuit has held "unchecked retaliatory co-worker harassment"
that is so "severe or pervasive" that a reasonable person would find the

terms or conditions of employment altered is cognizable.

4

Liability may

76. See cases cited supra note 59.
77. E.g., Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
78. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1297.
79. See cases cited supra note 59.
80. White, 364 F.3d at 796, n.1 (noting that the terms tangible employment action and adverse
employment action are interchangeable).
81. See cases cited supra note 59.
82. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 869-70 (holding retaliatory harassment creating a hostile work environment can constitute an adverse employment action where there is evidence that the conduct was
"'severe or perverse enough' to create 'an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive"'); Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000) (modifying the
second prong of plaintiffs prima facie case of retaliation to include adverse employment action or
"severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor").
83. Morris, 201 F.3d at 792 (holding employer is entitled to raise Ellerth affirmative defense to
sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment by a supervisor).
84. Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446 (holding retaliatory harassment by co-workers including putting
manure in employee's parking space, hair in employee's food, shooting rubber bands at employee, and
scratching employee's car satisfied the adverse employment action standard).
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be imputed to an employer in a co-worker retaliatory harassment scenario
according to general negligence principles.8 5
In support of the adverse employment action standard, moderate approach courts have relied on coterminous statutory construction and congressional intent.8 6 As the Fourth Circuit explained, ". . . Congress has not
expressed a stronger preference for preventing retaliation under §2000e-3
than for preventing actual discrimination under § 2000e-2" and "[i]n the
absence of strong policy considerations, conformity between the provisions
of Title VII is to be preferred."8 7
c.

The Restrictive Approach

The restrictive approach courts, including the Fifth and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have held that only "ultimate employment actions,"
such as "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating"
constitute adverse employment actions in the retaliation context.8 8 Under
this approach, "interlocutory or mediate employment decisions" did not
constitute adverse employment actions."a Therefore, threats of being fired,
being verbally reprimanded, lateral transfers, poor evaluations, or missed
pay increases, likewise did not qualify as adverse employment actions
under the restrictive approach.9 ° Applying the restrictive approach, courts
failed to recognize retaliatory hostile work environment harassment as a
cognizable adverse employment action.9
Courts have relied on the purpose and text of Title VII to justify the
restrictive approach.9 2 As the Fifth Circuit explained, "Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect
upon those decisions." 9 3 In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., the court reasoned that characterizing "interlocutory or mediate employment actions"
as adverse employment actions would subject the employer to liability for
"anything which might jeopardize employment in the future," and thus
contravened the purpose of Title VII.94 Moreover, the Mattern court asserted that proper statutory construction of the anti-retaliation provision
restricts coverage to ultimate employment actions only.9 5 In Mattern, the
court relied on the main anti-discrimination provision in interpreting the
85. Id. (holding employer may be liable for retaliatory co-worker harassment if he knows or
reasonably should have known about the harassment but failed to take prompt remedial action).
86. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863-64; Morris, 201 F.3d at 787 (relying on the "common rule of
statutory construction: namely that [a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally
read the same way each time it appears").
87. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863, n.1 (quoting Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d
355, 366 (4th Cir.1985)).
88. See cases cited supra note 60.
89. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708.
90. Id.; Manning, 125 F.3d at 692.
91. Id.
92. Mattern. 104 F.3d at 707-09; see Manning, 125 F. 3d at 692.
93. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir.1995)).
94. ld.at 708.
95. Id. at 708-09.
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anti-retaliation provision.9 6 The court explained that subsection (a)(1)
which proscribes discrimination based on express terms "contrasts sharply"
with subsection (a)(2) which is vague and consequentially broader in its
proscriptions. 97 The Mattern court deduced, "[t]he anti-retaliation provision speaks only of 'discrimination;' there is no mention of the vague harms
contemplated in [anti-discrimination provision] (a)(2). Therefore, this provision can only be read to exclude such vague harms, and to include only
ultimate employment decisions."98
IV.

INSTANT CASE

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among the
circuits regarding whether Section 704 of Title VII proscribes only workplace or employment-related retaliatory actions and to illustrate the severity of harm cognizable under the provision. 99 The Supreme Court affirmed
the Sixth Circuit's ultimate finding, but rejected the rule applied in favor of
an expansive standard. 00 The Justices unanimously agreed that Burlington's actions constituted unlawful retaliatory conduct. 10 1 Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but rejected the majority's standard in favor of a
10 2
moderate definition of retaliatory conduct.
A.

Justice Breyer's Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer concluded that Burlington had
indeed retaliated against White in violation of Title VII.' 0 3 The Court disagreed with the retaliation standard applied by the Sixth Circuit, instead
opting for a more liberal standard as employed in the Seventh and District
of Columbia Circuits.10 4 The Court held that Title VII's "anti-retaliation
provision does not confine the actions and harms that it forbids to those
that are related to employment or occur at the workplace."1 0 5 The Court
further held that a cognizable retaliatory action is "materially adverse to
the reasonable employee or applicant" and "the employer's actions must
be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker
from making a charge of discrimination."10 6 In other words, a fact-finder is
no longer required to find that the alleged retaliatory conduct is related to
the "terms and conditions of employment," as long as the conduct meets
10 7
the "materially adverse action" standard.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2411.
Id. at 2408.
Id.
Id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2417.
Id. at 2411-12 (citing Washington, 420 F.3d at 662; Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1217-18).
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2409.
Id.
Id. at 2416.
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Justice Breyer engaged in careful analysis of both the language and
purpose of Tile VII and rejected both the petitioner's and the Solicitor
General's arguments that the substantive and anti-retaliation provisions
should be read in pari materia.10 8 Commencing with a textual argument,
Justice Breyer noted that the language in Section 703(a) of Title VII diverges from the language used in Section 704(a) in important ways.1 09 The
Court explained that the substantive anti-discrimination provision expressly contains the limiting language "hire, discharge, compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, employment opportunities,
and status as an employer," whereas the anti-retaliation provision does not
contain such limiting language. t Relying on Rusello v. United States, the
Court followed the presumption that where Congress uses different language in the provisions of a statute they have acted "intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."" '1 The Court reasoned
that the anti-retaliation provision was not aimed merely at the terms and
conditions of employment and thus has a broader sweep than the substantive provision.
Next, Justice Breyer bolstered his argument with a thorough examination of the purpose of the two provisions.' 12 Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the antidiscrimination provision is to ensure a work environment free of discrimination based on one's race, ethnicity, religion, or gender.1 13 Whereas, the
purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to prevent workplace discrimination by ensuring employee's have access, free of retaliation, to implement the "Act's basic guarantees."' 4 In other words, "[t]he substantive
provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e.,
their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individ'
uals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct."115
In order to achieve these different objectives, the Court reasoned that
the anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions require different
constructions." 6 The Court cited examples of how an employer may effectively retaliate against an employee through conduct "not directly related
to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.""' 7
Thus, the Court explained that limiting construction of the anti-retaliation
108. Id. at 2411-12.
109. Id. at 2211.
110. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
111. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2211 (quoting 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
112. Id. at 2412.
113. Id. (citing 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2412 (citing Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1213 (FBI retaliation against employee
"took the form of the FBI's refusal, contrary to policy, to investigate death threats a federal prisoner
made against [the agent] and his wife"); Berry, 74 F.3d at 986 (finding actionable retaliation where
employer filed false criminal charges against the former employee who complained about
discrimination)).
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provision to only the terms and conditions of employment could not deter
the various manifestations retaliation may assume.11 8 As Justice Breyer
noted, such narrow construction would cause the anti-retaliation provision
to fail in its essential purpose of "maintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms."" ' 9 Rejecting the argument of both petitioner and
Solicitor General, Justice Breyer explained that the statutes' different purposes resolve any averred "anomaly," and further validates the different
20
constructions.1
Further substantiating the Court's view, Justice Breyer emphasized
that neither precedent nor the EEOC manual compel a more restrictive
construction. 12' The Court noted the absence of binding precedent on the
issue and distinguished the Ellerth "tangible employment action" standard
on the grounds that Ellerth did not deal with Title VII's retaliation provision, but rather dealt with vicarious liability issues.122 Additionally, the
Court explained that the EEOC 1998 Manual, which provides the only express statement on whether the anti-retaliation provision is limited to the
activity addressed in the anti-discrimination provision, affirms that it is not
123
so limited.
After establishing that the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond
employment or workplace-related actions, the Court set forth the standard
for the severity of harm actionable under the provision. 12 Relying on
Rochon v. Gonzales and Washington v. II. Dept. of Revenue, the Court explained, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means
that it well might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.' "125 Consistent with Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore, Justice Breyer emphasized the standard of "material adversity" as crucial in delineating actionable harms from occasional teasing
and trivial harms which occur in virtually all workplaces. 126 In establishing
this standard, the Court looked again to the purpose of the statute in providing employees "unfettered access" to remedial measures. 12 7 The Court
reasoned that normally trivial slights and "simple lack of good manners" do
1 28
not so hinder employee access.
The Court further explained that the material adverse action standard
is objective and thus judicially administrable. 129 Additionally, the Court
emphasized the importance of contextual considerations in the analysis
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. (quoting Robinson Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
Id. at 2414.
Id. at 2413.
Id.
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2413.
Id. at 2415.
Id. (citing Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 662)).
Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002 (1998)).
Id.
Id.
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
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under the standard.1 3 ° Finally, the Court rejected Justice Alito's argument
that the standard would require a court to review the type of discrimination
that resulted in the original discrimination charge. 3 1 As Justice Breyer
stated, "the standard is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the underas such
lying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint" and
1 32
will serve as an effective filter for actionable retaliation claims.
In conclusion, the Court applied the new standard to the facts of the
case and found sufficient evidence to support of the jury verdict on White's
retaliation claims.13 3 First, the Court found that White's reassignment constituted retaliation; although both duties were within the same job description, the forklift operator position was more prestigious and less arduous
than the track labor position. 134 Second, the Court held that White's thirtyseven day suspension constituted retaliation despite the fact that she was
reinstated with backpay 1 35 The Court explained that a reasonable employee would view the economic hardship that accompanies36indefinite suspension as a deterrent to engaging in protected activities.1
B.

Justice Alito's Concurrence

Concurring in the Court's judgment, Justice Alito rejected the majority's interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, as well as
the standard established for cognizable retaliation. 3 7 Justice Alito agreed
with the Sixth Circuit's construction and contended that the anti-retaliation
provision should be interpreted in pari materia with the substantive antidiscrimination provision . 38 Advocating a harmonious interpretation of
discrimination under the two provisions, he stated, "discrimination under
§ 704(a) means the discriminatory acts reached by § 703(a) - chiefly, discrimination 'with respect to ...compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. ' 139 Justice Alito further contended that this
interpretation affords an objective, judicially administrable standard that
offers sufficient protection to employees with valid retaliation claims while
filtering out those with trivial claims.' 4 °
Justice Alito noted that the previous Sixth Circuit or moderate "materially adverse employment action" definition was appropriately expanded
130. Id. (citing Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 998 (explaining the real impact of workplace behavior can only
be ascertained by examining the particular context of the action, including the surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships in the workplace); Washington, 420 F.3d at 662 (finding flextime schedule is critical to employee with a disabled child)).
131. Id. at 2416 (rejecting Justice Alito's argument that the majority's interpretation implied that
the protection afforded a retaliation victim was inversely proportional to the severity of the discrimination that led to the retaliation).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2417.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2419.
140. Id.
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to a new context in Ellerth and advocated the test be "imported to the
retaliation context."' 14 1 He argued that the moderate "materially adverse
1 42
employment action" test is not as restrictive as the majority contended.
First, Justice Alito reasoned that it is more probable that an employer
would retaliate against an employee on the job due to the abundance of
opportunities in that setting and the fear that off-the-job retaliation may be
criminal. 1 43 Second, he argued that the moderate "materially adverse employment action" standard is not restricted to on-the-job retaliation as the
majority maintained because it applies to "terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.""' 4 Illustrating his point, Justice Alito explained that in
Rochon the FBI's failure to provide off-duty security, that would have otherwise been furnished, easily qualifies as a "term, condition, or privilege of
employment," thus satisfied the "materially adverse employment" standard
although the incident did not technically occur on the job.1 45 Therefore,
interpreting the statutes as coterminous would preclude the need to expand
the scope of the anti-retaliation provision. 4 6
Justice Alito argued that the majority's test raises "practical consequences" contrary to congressional intent. 147 First, he contended that the
standard presents "perverse results" because it implies that the amount of
protection offered a retaliation victim is "inversely proportional to the severity of the original act of discrimination that prompted the retaliation.'1 48 Justice Alito reasoned that it would be more difficult to dissuade
a reasonable employee who was severely discriminated against from filing a
complaint than it would be to dissuade a reasonable employee who was less
severely discriminated against; therefore the latter category of employee is
actually afforded more protection.149 Second, he argued that the majority's
concept of a "reasonable worker" is imprecise because it involves individual characteristics of the alleged victim such as age, gender, and family obligations.150 Justice Alito suggested that this will ultimately confuse courts as
to the relevance of other potential characteristics. 15 1 Finally, he criticized
the causation standard as "loose and unfamiliar" and
implied it will further
52
law.1
the
of
area
complex"
"already
an
complicate
Applying the interpretation that Section 704(a) extends only to those
discriminatory acts shielded by Section 703(a), Justice Alito would vote to
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

White, 126 S.Ct. at 2419.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2420.
Id.
Id.
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2420.
Id. at 2420-21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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affirm the Court of Appeal decision that White's transfer and suspension
constituted an unlawful retaliation. 5 3
V.

ANALYSIS

In establishing the "material adverse action" standard, the Court has
adhered to the text and purpose of Title VII. Adopting the expansive approach, the Court has set forth an objective standard that is realistic in its
approach to preventing retaliation. Importation of the Ellerth standard or
moderate approach, as advocated by Justice Alito, would have contravened
both the text and purpose of the Act and would have proved less effective
for the prevention of retaliation. The inadequacy of Justice Alito's proffered standard reflects a general misunderstanding of the plight of employees subjected to retaliation and the ultimate chilling effect that retaliation
has on Title VII's objectives. Furthermore, importation of the Ellerth/
Faragheraffirmative defense would compound the problems of Justice Alito's proffered standard.
A.

The Contextually-Driven "MaterialAdverse Action" Standard
Advances the Primary Purpose of the
Anti-Retaliation Provision.

The "material adverse action" standard furthers the primary purpose
of the retaliation provision, and advances the ultimate objective of Title
VII. Recognizing the myriad of forms of retaliation existing outside the
realm of the terms and conditions of employment, the "material adverse
action" standard promotes the primary purpose of Section 704 in providing
"unfettered access" to Title VII's remedial mechanisms.15 4 Had the Court
adopted either the moderate or restrictive approaches, the focus would be
placed on the ultimate outcome of the employment action rather than on
the deterrent effects of retaliation. Such an outcome-based focus ignores
the profound chilling effect that retaliation triggers for those protected
under the statute and on other co-workers as well. Because of this chilling
effect, a less expansive standard would defeat the ultimate prophylactic
purpose of Title VII. By adopting an expansive, deterrent-focused approach, the Court has precluded employers from maintaining a laundry list
of harms, which although judicially sanctioned, are nonetheless retaliatory. 5 5 As the Amici reiterate in their brief to the Supreme Court, "[i]f the
employee's right to claim unlawful discrimination is not absolutely protected, the substantive protections offered by Title VII ring hollow."15' 6
By adopting a contextually-driven standard, the Court continues its
deterrent focus and further advances the purpose of Title VII. Recognizing
153. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2421-22.
154. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
155. See Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006)
(No.05-259).
156. Id.
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that harms immaterial in certain circumstances may be material in others,
the Court has adopted a practical approach to remedying retaliation. As
expressed by the Amici in their brief to the Supreme Court, ". . .one can
not exhaustively catalogue abuses of employer power prior to knowing
what tools that supervisor has at his or her disposal, and without understanding how employees rely upon the workplace benefits or rules being
used for the purpose of retaliation."1'57 For example, changing an employee's work schedule may be immaterial to certain workers, but may be
of critical importance to mother with a disabled child.' 5 8 Without a contextual understanding of an employee's reliance upon, for instance, a flex-time
schedule, a court may be unable to fully ascertain whether such a scheduling change constituted material retaliation. Additionally as the Court
notes, requiring materiality of the harm prevents making a federal case of
trivial harms and transforming Title VII into a "general civility code."' 5 9
While requiring consideration of the context of the situation, the "materially adverse action" standard is, as the Court notes, objective and judicially administrable. 6 ° Notwithstanding criticism by commentators,' 6 ' the
standard enunciated in White is workable and necessary. The Supreme
Court has adopted a robust stance against retaliation by holding that any
action that an employer takes that has a retaliatory animus, and is likely to
deter a reasonable worker in that situation from engaging in a statutorily
protected activity is unlawful retaliation. 16 2
One commentator has raised particular concerns regarding the application of the material adverse action standard in the retaliatory harassment
context. 63 Retaliatory harassment was not at issue in White, thus it was
not expressly addressed by the Court. However, it stands to reason that if
the creation of a hostile work environment "well might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination" then it
would fit squarely within the "materially adverse action" standard set forth
64
in White.'

157. Id.
158. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (citing Washington, 420 F.3d at 662).
159. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
160. Id.
161. Gamer, supra note 59, at 296-302 (criticizing the White standard as unclear and unfair to
employers); Harvard Law Review Association, Standard for Retaliatory Conduct, 120 HARV. L. REV.
312, 321 (2006) (criticizing the "stark contrast" between the scope of Section 703 and Section 704 as
implying a narrow definition of 703 inconsistent with prior precedent and congressional intent).
162. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
163. Gamer, supra note 59, at 269-302 ("Burlington Northern did not address whether HWE [hostile work environment] harassment standards apply to retaliation claims. Consequently, employers remain unguided on their liability for retaliatory harassment.").
164. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
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B. Importing the Hostile Work Environment or Constructive Discharge
Requirements into the Retaliation Context Defeats the Purpose of the
Anti-Retaliation Provision.
Following the Court's decision in White, there are now three levels of
actionable harassing conduct: (1) conduct sufficient to constitute retaliation; (2) conduct sufficient to create a hostile work environment; and (3)
conduct sufficient to constitute a constructive discharge. While the multitiered levels of liability may be complicated, they are necessary as a result
of the Court's ill advised decisions regarding hostile work environment1 65
and constructive discharge. 6 6 The Court could have applied the material
adverse action standard in hostile work environment cases and then ratcheted up that standard in the constructive discharge actions. However the
Court has chosen otherwise, and we now have a continuum of conduct for
three different levels of liability.
One commentator has opined that the White standard requires clarification in retaliatory hostile work environment claims and urged that the
Ellerth/Faragheraffirmative defense be offered to employers in this context. 16 7 As noted previously, the Court did not explicitly address retaliatory hostile work environment in White, but the Court did expressly reject
the application of the holdings of Ellerth, Faragher,and Pennsylvania State
Police v. Suders on the grounds that those cases dealt with vicarious liability of employers. 168 Moreover, the White Court emphasized that the antidiscrimination provision and the anti-retaliation provisions serve distinct
purposes, thus require different interpretations. 1 69 Therefore, it seems that
the Court has rejected the importation of the additional requirements for
hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims in the discrimination context into the retaliation context.
Application of the additional judicially-imposed requirements, as well
as the affirmative defense offered employers in hostile work environment
and hostile-environment constructive discharge claims would directly contravene the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provision. Analysis of
the hostile work environment and the hostile-environment constructive discharge requirements in comparison to requirements for a retaliation claim
may be illustrative on this point.
1. Hostile Work Environment.
Under Section 703, hostile work environment harassment may occur
where a tangible employment action is absent, provided that the conduct
165. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 743-46 (importing tangible employment action standard rather than material adverse action standard).
166. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004) (establishing the threshold for
constructive discharge claims as "facts alleging constructive discharge must be so intolerable that a
reasonable person would be forced to quit").
167. Gamer, supra note 59, at 302.
168. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2413.
169. Id.
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was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" so as to alter the terms or conditions
of employment. 170

The Supreme Court has defined such conduct as

"creat[ing] an objectively hostile or abusive work environment - an envi'171

ronment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.
One commentator has explored how the "severe or pervasive" requirement has been exploited in some lower courts "to excuse harassment
against women.' 72 The "severe or pervasive" standard arose out of dicta
from a Fifth Circuit case and this language is overdramatic in light of the
definition provided in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.1 73 After Harris,however, lower courts have misapplied the "severe or pervasive" standard and
excused egregious sexual harassment.1 74 By requiring conduct that is both
severe and pervasive in hostile work environment cases, certain lower
courts have excused conduct constituting sexual assault or attempted sexual assault under criminal law, 75 while other courts have misused the standard by requiring proof that the "conduct tangibly affected the plaintiff's
job performance. ' 176 Furthermore, other courts have parsed the evidence
and ignored retaliatory conduct in the determination of whether harassment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" leaving the plaintiff in a
"Catch-22.' 1 77 For the harassment to be sufficiently "severe or pervasive,"
170. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
171. Id.
172. Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment To Be "Severe or Pervasive" DiscriminatesAmong the "Terms and Conditions" of Employment. 62
MD. L. REV. 85, 85-6 (2003).
173. Id. at 95-100 (explaining that "severe of pervasive" terminology arose from dicta in Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 111-15 (citing Blough v. Hawkins Market, Inc., 51 F. Supp.2d 858, 862 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (court held that a co-worker grabbing another co-workers buttocks and crotch, trying to kiss her,
and engaging in stimulation in front of her was not severe and pervasive because the incidents occurred
over nine month period); Hannigan-Hass v. Bakers Life & Casualty Co., No. 95 C 7408, 1996 WL
650419 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 6, 1996) (court held that an incident in which the vice president of the company
locked the plaintiff in his office, pushed her against a wall, told her to open her mouth, and then tried to
kiss her, touch her breast, and put his hands under her pantyhose was not severe or pervasive because it
was only one incident); Crenshaw v. Delray Farms, 968 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that the
following conduct which occurred over a four month period did not constitute a hostile work environment: co-worker grabbed plaintiff's breast, told plaintiff he needed someone like her to have sex with,
grabbed her buttocks, called her "an ignorant ass bitch," then another co-worker rubbed his penis on
her back, then a third co-worker offered her money to have sex with him, tried to kiss her, pried the
lock off of a bathroom door from where she was hiding and tried to grab her, then a fourth co-worker
told plaintiff "that the pants she was wearing made his groins growl" and that he wanted to go to a hotel
and perform lewd sexual acts on her)).
176. Id. at 115-18 (citing Kenyon v. Western Extrusions Corp., No. Civ. A 3:98CV2431L, 2000 WL
12902 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2000) (holding that fifty alleged incidents of sexual harassment, including plaintiff's supervisor staring at her breasts, touching her bodily in a sexually explicit way, rubbing his genitals
on her, inquiring if she was wearing panties, and telling her to "hike up [her] dress" were not severe or
pervasive because her "workplace competence" was intact); McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-5780, 1997 WL 799437 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (holding that supervisor forcing
plaintiff to kiss him, asking her out constantly, had retaliated against her, and screamed at her after she
announced her engagement did not alter the terms or conditions of her employment and did not impede her job performance)).
177. Id. at 129-139 (citing Vargas-Harrison v. Waukegan Community Unit School District #60, No.
97 C 1071, 1998 WL 831837 (N.D. I11.Nov. 25, 1998); Dudley v. Metro-Dade County, 989 F. Supp. 1192
(S.D. Fla. 1997)).
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courts insist that the conduct must go on for a significant time period.
Thus, if a plaintiff reports the harassment too soon it will not satisfy the
''severe or pervasive" standard.
This "Catch-22" scenario is particularly salient when considered in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Clark County School District v.

Breeden.'78 In this case, the plaintiff reported a single incident as sexual
harassment, and was allegedly retaliated against.179 The Court held that no
reasonable person would believe this particular single incident rose to the
level of "severe or pervasive," and dismissed the retaliation claim.' 80 When
looking merely at the facts of the case, the holding is appealing. However,
considering the legal ramifications of the decision, it is problematic because
the Court has imputed knowledge of a legal standard, "severe or pervasive" to the plaintiff. 8 ' Under Breeden, when a victim makes a flawed
assessment of a legal standard, and then reports the conduct, she may be
retaliated against with impunity by her employer. 82 Under Ellerth, however, if the plaintiff does not report the harassment the court may find that
she has not mitigated the harm and she may be denied recovery all
83
together.
In light of the abuses tolerated under the "severe or pervasive" standard, the Court should not impose this requirement upon plaintiffs making
a retaliatory hostile work environment claim. The discordance of the "severe or pervasive" standard and the "material adverse action" standard established in White is patent.
The lower courts seem to recognize this dissonance in employer-created retaliatory hostile work environment cases. In Spector v. Board of
Trustees of Community Technical College, a Connecticut District court de-

nied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's retaliatory hostile work environment claim on the grounds that, "White, not Harris, sets the standard
for determining whether an employer's actions constitute an adverse employment action. [Plaintiff] has alleged facts sufficient to allow a reasonable
inference that the defendants created a hostile work environment in retaliation for [plaintiff's] protected speech."' 84 In Moore v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that prior to White,
employees claiming retaliation through workplace harassment bore the
burden of showing that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to
create a hostile work environment in violation of Section 703 in order to be

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Johnson, supra note 172, at 139 (citing 532 U.S. 268 (2001)(per curium).
Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269-71.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 172, at 134.
Id.
Id.
No. 3:06-cv-129(JCH), 2006 WL 3462576, at *13 (Civ. Disc. Ct. D. Conn. Nov. 29, 2006).
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protected under Section 704; however under White that is no longer re-

quired.185 However, the First and Sixth Circuits have continued to impose
the "severe
or pervasive" standard in retaliatory hostile work environment
6
cases.

18

The lower court's treatment of co-worker retaliatory harassment is a
bit murkier. The lower courts recognize the concept of co-worker retaliatory harassment as a valid claim, but in accord with187tradition, liability to the
employer under a general negligence framework.

In White the Supreme Court declared, "[a] plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reason1 88

able worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
This declaration makes no mention whatsoever that the materially adverse
action be severe or pervasive. It contravenes the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision to arbitrarily import such requirements from the discrimination context into the retaliation context.
2.

The Ellerth/Faragheraffirmative defense.
In Ellerth v. Burlington Industries'

ton,190

and Faragherv. City of Boca Ra-

the Supreme Court examined the scope of employer liability in hos-

tile work environment cases. In both of these cases the plaintiffs sought to

impute liability to their employers for sexual harassment from their supervisors, although the plaintiffs "suffer[ed] no adverse, tangible job
consequences."191
As noted supra, the Court defined a "tangible employment action" as

"a significant change in employment status, such as hiring firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different job responsibilities, or a

185. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006); see Hoffelt v. Ill. Dept. of
Human Rights, No. 1-05-1629, 2006 WL 29973369 (I11.
App.1 Dist. Oct. 20, 2006) (holding the cumulative effects of harassment, including retaliatory harassment, to be considered part of plaintiff's claim of
hostile work environment and finding supervisory retaliatory harassment was a materially adverse action without mention of severe of pervasive standard); see Hare v. Potter, 220 Fed. Appx. 120, 131 (3d
Cir. 2007) (rejecting the severe or pervasive standard in retaliatory hostile work environment cases in
light of White).
186. Riveria-Martinez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 2007 WL 16069, *4 (1st Cir. Jan. 4, 2007)
("For a plaintiff to prove retaliation based on an employer's toleration of harassment, she must show
that the employer tolerated severe or pervasive harassment motivated by the plaintiff's protected conduct."); Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Services, 453 F.3d 724, 736 (6th Cir. 2006) (defining the third
element of a prima facie case of retaliatory harassment as "the defendant subsequently took an adverse,
retaliatory action against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory
harassment by a supervisor').
187. Juarez v. Utah, 2008 WL 313671, *8 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 2008); EEOC v. Body Firm Aerobics,
Inc., No. 2:03 CV 846 TC,2006 WL 1993784 (D. Utah, July 14, 2006) (recognizing co-worker retaliatory
harassment if sufficiently severe); Juarez v. Utah Department of Health, No. 2:05CV0053PGC, 2006
WL 2623905 (D. Utah, Sept. 11, 2006) (imputing liability to employer for co-worker retaliatory harassment only where the employer orchestrated or had knowledge of the harassment).
188. White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
189. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
190. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
191. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
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change in benefits. 192 In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court defined two
types of hostile work environment claims: (1) harassment that "culminates
in a tangible employment action," in which employers are to be held
strictly liable and (2) harassment that does not involve a tangible employ193
ment action, in which employers may assert an affirmative defense.
When no tangible employment action has occurred, an employer may
avoid vicarious liability for supervisor harassment by establishing an affirmative defense if (1) "the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) "the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.' 194 Under this doctrine, the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate harm and
the defendant bears the burden to prove that the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to do so.195

3.

Hostile Environment Constructive Discharge
Constructive discharge occurs when "an employee's reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to
a formal discharge for remedial purposes."'1 96 Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders is the seminal case on hostile environment constructive discharge,
which occurs when a plaintiff advances a "compound claim" of a hostile
work environment that culminated in the plaintiff feeling compelled to quit
her job. 197 In Suders, the Supreme Court explained, "[a] hostile-environment constructive discharge claim entails something more [than mere hostile work environment or sexual harassment]: A plaintiff who advances
such a claim must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable
person would have felt compelled to resign."' 98
Constructive discharge claims are often tied to underlying sexual harassment and retaliation. As one commenter notes, often with constructive
discharge cases, the plaintiff was exposed to sexual harassment, reported
the harassment, the harassment continued and worsened until culminating
in the plaintiff feeling coerced to quit. 199 This is a likely scenario considering statistics that reveal sixty-two percent of state employees who filed formal complaints of sexual harassment reported being retaliated against.2 "°
192. Id. at 761.
193. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; accord Faragher,524 U.S. at 807-08.
194. Id. at 756; accord Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
195. Suders, 542 U.S. at 146.
196. Id. at 141 (citing 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 838-839
(3d ed.1996).
197. Id. (importing the Ellerth/Faragherframework, the employer is held strictly liable when an
"official action" underlies the constructive discharge the employer is held strictly liable, but where no
"official action" occurred the employer is entitled to an affirmative defense).
198. Id. at 144.
199. Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge,77 S. CAL.
L. REV. 307, 334 (2004).
200. Id. (citing Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn't She Just Report
Him? The Psychologicaland Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment,51 J. Soc.
IssuEs 117, 122 (1995)).
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The Interplay of Retaliation, Hostile Work Environment Harassment,
and Constructive Discharge.

As noted supra, claims of hostile work environment followed by retaliation are often the stepping stones for constructive discharge claims. The
hierarchy of the legal thresholds in these cases is as follows: (a) under
White, retaliation requires a material adverse action that "well might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination;" 0 1 (b) under Harris,hostile work environment claims must rise to
the level of sufficiently "severe or pervasive" so as to "create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment - an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile of abusive;" ' and (c) under Suders, to support a
hostile-environment constructive discharge claim a plaintiff must show
"working conditions bec[a]me so intolerable that a reasonable person in
the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign."203 Although
the "severe or pervasive" and "so intolerable" thresholds have been
abused by some courts to excuse intolerable sexual harassment against women, the differences between those thresholds and the threshold for retaliation make sense. As the White Court explained, the anti-retaliation
provision has a broader sweep than the anti-discrimination provision because the provisions serve different individual goals. 2" For this reason
alone, importation of the Ellerth/Faragheraffirmative defense from the discrimination context into the retaliation context is illogical.
In Suders, the Court acknowledged that its motivation for implementing the EllerthiFaragherframework stemmed from its desire to further Title
VII's deterrent purpose by "encourag[ing] employees to report harassing
conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive."2 5 The Court has further
acknowledged that the impetus for linking liability to the effectiveness of
the employer's grievance policy was to implement effective grievance procedures.20 6 However, in a retaliatory situation, an employee has already
reported discriminatory conduct and seemingly the employer's grievance
procedures have failed her. Thus, the victim in a retaliation context has
already fulfilled the objective of the Ellerth/Faragherframework. As the
White Court explained, the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is providing "unfettered access to remedial mechanisms. 1207 If the Ellerth/Faragheraffirmative defense is imported into the retaliation context,
it would impede access rather than promote it.
By adopting an expansive approach in White, the Court has moved
onto the right track to protect employees from retaliation. One may speculate whether the robust protection offered by the Court, stems in part from
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

White. 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.
Suders, 542 U.S. at 141.
White, 126 S.Ct. at 2412-13.
Suders, 542 U.S. at 145 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764).
Id.
White, 125 S.Ct. at 2412 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
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its desire to have sexual harassment victims mitigate harm and report egregious conduct sooner rather than later.2 °8 This certainly is a commendable
goal; however, there may be several other contributing factors as to why
women do not report sexual harassment. 0 9
One commentator has explained that it is "atypical" for victims of sexual harassment to file an internal complaint, even when the harassment was
so egregious that they may later feel compelled to file a lawsuit. 210 For
example, in a survey of federal workers only twelve percent of harassed
female employees actually reported the harassment. 21 1 The fear that women face is "debilitating" because sexual harassment is often judged by a
societal double standard stacked against women. 21 2 Additionally, women
are more often victims of sexual assault and rape than men, and as a result
their sensitivity to sexual misconduct and fear of reporting it are more than
some groundless form of hysteria.2 13
It seems that the "Catch-22" harassment victims find themselves in 21as5
a result of Ellerth2 4 requiring that harassment be reported and Breeden
which allows an employer to retaliate with impunity if a victim is incorrect
in her assessment of a legal threshold may also contribute to the failure to
report. In spite of the discord between the actual behavior of victims and
the expectations imposed upon them by the law, offering employees more
protection against retaliation and some compensation for the higher standards imposed for hostile environment and constructive discharge is
laudable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has gotten on the right track in White by adopting
an expansive approach to protecting employees from retaliation by employers, thus furthering the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision, as
well as the ultimate purpose of Title VII. Importing the Ellerth/Faragher
framework into the retaliatory context would only place another obstacle
in the path of an employee who has availed herself of Title VII's protections, thus directly contravening the purpose of Section 704.

208. See, e.g, Suders, 542 U.S. at 144.
209. Chamallas, supra note 196, at 337; Johnson, supra note 172, at 140.
210. Chamallas, supra note 196, at 337.
211. Id. (citing United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace:
Trends, Progress, Continuing Challenges 30 (1994)).
212. Johnson, supra note 172, at 140.
213. Id.
214. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
215. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.

